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The Moving Boundaries of Social Heat: 
Gambling in Rural China 
 
Dr Hans Steinmüller 
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany 
steinmuller@eth.mpg.de 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Whilst gambling for money was prohibited during the Maoist era, since the 1980s it has become 
very common in many rural areas of central China. It is often the major communal activity in 
many villages, a focus point of daily gossip and an object of government campaigns. I describe 
several forms of gambling common in Bashan Township, Eastern Hubei Province, and relate 
them to local discourses on capability/skill and luck/fate. Gambling reproduces ‘social heat’, 
which is a desired form of social effervescence as long as it remains within certain boundaries. 
But the boundaries of accepted gambling and social heat in local sociality as well as those given 
in official representations and state discourse, are contested, and both stand in an ambiguous 
relationship to each other; a relationship that is described in terms of ‘cultural intimacy’. Using 
medium-range concepts such as ‘social heat’ and ‘cultural intimacy’ the article attempts to avoid 
the pitfalls of totalizing approaches which explain popular gambling as consequence of or 
resistance to ‘neoliberalism’.  
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Just about two weeks after my arrival in Zhongba village, some young men offered to teach me 
zha jinhua. Zha jinhua – ‘bash the golden flower’ – is a card game similar to poker but with only 
three cards for each player. The gamblers, usually half a dozen or more, take turns putting money 
on the table, each betting on the combination of cards in front of him. Everyone must put in at 
least one yuan1 as an ante, a basic amount at the beginning to enter the betting round. As in poker, 
each player has three options: to increase the highest previous bet, to match the highest previous 
bet and “call”, or to give up his hand. Each game is worth an average of 50-100 yuan, and only 
lasts a couple of minutes.  
 
I vividly remember the first evening I spent with these young men; notes of ten, fifty, and a 
hundred yuan were speedily handed over the low table. Most players placed their bills on the 
table softly, but now and then someone would hit the table with his palm to underscore his 
defiance of the others’ bets. In the beginning I didn't understand why all the rustling heap of 
banknotes constantly shifted from one player to the other. The action was taking place so fast that 
I couldn't keep up with the players or their bets. The ups and downs of the game were constantly 
accompanied by the jokes and swearwords of the gamblers, and commentary from the bystanders.  
“Five.” 
“Ten.” 
“That’s it for me, I fold.” 
“I’ll take this one.” 
“I’ll do it. Double raise!” 
And so it went on, until the next showdown, when either everyone had drawn level, or all save 
one had given up their hands. Filled with cigarette smoke, the room resonated with the 
exclamations, the swearwords, and the comments of the players and the swift clapping of cards 
and banknotes. It was ‘noisy and hot’ (E. naore2), quite literally.  
 
Sitting there, I was surprised, almost shocked, at the amounts that these young men were 
gambling with – easily more than a week’s income from a job in Beijing, Shanghai or Guangzhou, 
let alone what they could earn in the odd jobs they could find locally. I thought of what I had read 
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before embarking on my fieldwork about the huge inequalities in wealth in China today, about 
neoliberal regimes and ‘casino capitalism’ (1986). Could it be that I had encountered here 
something akin to what the Comaroffs had called ‘the occult economies’ of ‘millennial capitalism 
and the culture of neoliberalism’ (1999; 2000)? 
 
In the context of rural China, it seems that such an argument holds quite well: in fact most of the 
young people migrating to the cities to work in factories and other low-skill manual jobs are 
participating in a hugely unequal economy. According to official data, urban per capita incomes 
were on average three times higher than rural incomes, and five to six times higher if the gap of 
government spending on public services (health and education in particular) was taken into 
account (UNDP 2008:33), but this does not fully reveal the realities that are so visible to most 
people in the countryside. Both on TV and in their everyday lives in the city they are confronted 
with glaring inequalities on a daily basis. It is in particular the young who are susceptible to 
dreams of incredible wealth, who want to “take the plunge” (xiahai), leave the countryside and 
risk a business enterprise, yet who in the majority of cases end up as wage labourers (da gong). 
How would they explain it to themselves that some “got rich first”, that some in this society are 
buying cars and houses that they will be never able to buy in a lifetime, and that the countryside 
where they are from seems more and more stagnant, a place of boredom and dullness? Is not the 
most obvious explanation simply “luck” or something like “magic”, just what one would need in 
gambling? Is the gambling of the marginalized then not just a mirror of rising inequalities and 
dreams of easy money? A reflection of the frustrations and desires of ‘millenial capitalism’, and 
maybe even a form of resistance against it?  
 
Several authors have described contemporary Chinese society in general, and internal labour 
migration in particular, in terms of ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘millenial capitalism’ (e.g. Yan 2003; Ngai 
2003; Lee 2006). And at least one article puts a particularly spectacular form of gambling in rural 
China – the liuhecai underground lotteries – into the same framework (Bosco et al. 2009). But 
this is not the direction I want to take here. Following Andrew Kipnis’s recent critiques of ‘tropes 
of neoliberalism’ in China (Kipnis 2007; 2008), I argue that analysing popular gambling in rural 
China in terms of ‘neoliberalism’ would mean positing an absolute and totalizing frame which 
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misses out social action on the micro and medium range and obfuscating the interplay of local 
sociality, official discourse, and state control. 
 
After a short introduction about gambling in China, I will look at various forms of gambling in 
the villages of Bashan Township3 in South-western Hubei Province, and try to delineate how they 
are inter-related with discourses of capability and fate in other areas of life. In gambling itself, 
one can find certain local expressions around desired forms of sociality, which open up a 
semantic field of vitality, heat and fire. But there are also many occasions where gambling goes 
beyond the borders of the socially acceptable. Furthermore, the boundaries of the acceptable in 
expressions of a vital and ‘hot’ sociality in general, and of gambling in particular, have changed 
greatly in the last decades. The central section of this paper then deals with the different ways in 
which these boundaries are contested in local communities and in official ideology. In the 
discourses and practices of gambling, people negotiate the moving boundaries of acceptable 
sociality between young and old, between urban and rural, and between modernism and 
traditionalism; this also implies a contestation of the boundaries between state control and market, 
and between local sociality and official representation in contemporary China.  
 
 
Gambling in China 
Gambling in many different forms has a long history in China (cf. Gernet 1962:226; Wakeman 
1985:96, 625). There is even the probability that playing cards were first introduced to Europe 
from China (Wilkinson 1895). According to most accounts, gambling has been a part of rural life 
for a very long time. C.F. Fitzgerald for example writes about Dali in Yunnan in the 1930s, that 
the people there “are rather fond of gambling, card games being the favourite with adults, and 
dice with children” (Fitzgerald 2005 [1941]:191).  
 
While all gambling was forbidden during the Maoist era, since the 1980s many different forms of 
gambling and betting have become increasingly common. There are now various state sanctioned 
lotteries, of which the national sports and welfare lotteries are the biggest. Lottery sales are 
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growing rapidly, and the revenue from legal lottery sales in China was already ranked eight or 
ninth largest in the world in 2006 (Schmittzehe & Partners 2006:9). The scope of illegal gambling 
and betting is even larger, with revenues up to tenfold that of legal lotteries, according to some 
estimates (ibid.:19). In recent years, the liuhecai underground lottery, for instance, has spread 
rapidly over many regions of central China (Bosco et al. 2009). In this paper, I will not deal with 
legal or underground lotteries – none of which were common in the villages of Bashan at the time 
of fieldwork in 2007.4 Instead I focus on mahjong and various local card games which will be 
described below. These forms of gambling have become the most frequent leisure activity in 
Bashan in the last decades, and they are mostly condoned by local government.  
 
This surge of various forms of gambling – in particular the more spectacular illegal forms, such 
as the underground lotteries – invites explanation, and the context of a rapidly changing, 
‘neoliberal’ economy seems to suggest itself. In a recent article, Bosco et al. describe in precisely 
these terms the liuhecai underground lottery that has spread rapidly throughout most regions of 
central China during the last decade (Bosco et al. 2009). They first reject the argument about 
‘occult economies’ made in other parts of the world, where people reacted to the sudden arrival of 
commercialization and capitalism by viewing ‘the growth of money as magical and open to 
occult manipulation’ (ibid.:51). According to Bosco et al., this argument does not hold for the 
growth of underground lotteries in contemporary China, which has a long tradition of commerce 
and markets. In rural China, they suggest, ‘it is not the lack of sophistication in the market 
economy, but the accompanying frustrations and desires of consumer capitalism, and the growing 
gap in wealth, that underlies the lottery craze’ (ibid.:53). At pains to find an alternative 
interpretation for the apparent ‘irrationality’ of the underground lotteries, Bosco et al. conclude 
that this ‘irrationality’ makes sense once seen ‘in the context’ of an economy where luck, 
speculation, and corruption play a large role (ibid.:54). The lottery is ‘remarkably similar’ to 
speculation, it ‘captures the alchemy of neoliberalism: “to yield wealth without production”’ 
(ibid.:56); in sum, the lottery is yet another example of ‘millennial capitalism’.  
 
It is this conclusion of an otherwise very rich ethnography with which I have problems. Bosco et 
al. yield to what Latour has called ‘the temptation to jump to the “context”’, providing the 
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absolute scale of the ‘Big Picture’ or ‘panorama’ on which everything can be seen (Latour 
2005:184ff.). Various recent attempts at describing contemporary Chinese society in terms of 
‘neoliberalism’ or ‘millenial capitalism’  (e.g. Yan 2003; Ngai 2003; Lee 2006) fall into the same 
trap: framing their analyses in these big terms obscures broader differences between various 
forms of (neo-)liberal and anti-liberal governance, their implementation, and the ongoing political 
negotiations of actors on the ground. By positing a social whole instead, the trope of 
‘neoliberalism’ masks more than it reveals, as Andrew Kipnis has argued forcefully (Kipnis 
2007).5   
 
Most ethnographies of gambling do map out some ‘context’, i.e. they provide some correlations 
and associations between gambling and the socialities in which it takes place. Several recent 
anthropological interpretations of gambling have done so, while avoiding the leap to a totalizing 
picture. Evthymios Papataxiarchis for instance has described the idioms of spendthrift behaviour 
and ‘disinterested sociality’ in gambling on Lesbos (Papataxiarchis 1999), and Thomas Malaby 
has explored how people confront uncertainty and contingency in gambling on Crete (Malaby 
2003). Both Paptaxiarchis and Malaby argue that gambling reflects something else of the wider 
social context in which it takes place. Yet they are careful not to leap too many scales and not to 
give a total panorama of Greek society.  
 
Ellen Oxfeld Basu (1991) and Paul Festa (2007) have offered analyses of gambling in Chinese 
communities which similarly privilege social action at the micro and medium range.6 While both 
deal with mahjong in places far away from central China (the first in a Chinese community in 
Calcutta, and the second in Taiwan), several of the features they describe share some resemblance 
with gambling in Bashan. 
 
Ellen Oxfeld Basu starts from the apparent contradiction between the “entrepreneurial ethic” of a 
Chinese community of tanners in Calcutta and the propensity, in particular, of adult males for 
high-stakes gambling. In her words gambling “mimics and re-enacts both the risks and possible 
gains of entrepreneurship, but it does so within an arena contained by both temporal and spatial 
restrictions” (Oxfeld Basu 1991:255). Drawing on Goffman’s model of “fateful action” (Goffman 
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1967), Oxfeld Basu interprets mahjong gambling as an action that is “problematic”, 
“consequential” and “done for its own sake”, and hence a great occasion for the display of 
character; beyond that, it expresses wealth and status, and possibly “the central contradictions of 
the community’s ethos”, in the sense of Geertz’s “deep play” (Oxfeld Basu 1991:256, quoting 
Geertz 1973). Even though there are certain similarities, the place and role of both the 
“entrepreneurial ethics” and of gambling in rural China in 2007 differs from that of overseas 
Chinese communities. Nonetheless, like Oxfeld Basu, I want to focus on the internal 
contradiction between striving and luck/fate that become apparent in gambling.  
 
Paul Festa, in his analysis of mahjong gambling in Taiwan, also takes these two elements as 
distinctive parts of the social imagery of gambling. Using the theoretical framework proposed by 
Roger Caillois (2001[1958]) for the study of play, Festa distinguishes four modes of play: agon 
(competition), alea (chance), mimesis (simulation) and ilinx (vertigo). Using Caillois’s formal 
distinctions, Festa then provides the cultural content of mahjong gambling in Taiwan. First, he 
argues that “agon and alea animate dominant aspects of sociopolitical culture in Taiwan”, as in 
the ‘martial agon’ which men cultivate in politics and in the military. Festa connects the element 
of chance in gambling with certain images of the state, where both personal and national 
aspirations are linked together, as in the official lotteries, or in the astounding ways in which the 
state is also seen as an element of “fate” in individuals’ lives. The third element of mimesis is a 
“martial imaginary” that appears strikingly with his informants, who all took part in compulsory 
military service in Taiwan. The militarization of the island of course has a lot to do with the 
cross-straits conflict and the perceived threat of the PRC. The mainland also shares a history of 
militarization that is, however, different in many respects: perhaps most importantly, there is no 
compulsory military service, and for most men in Bashan, bodily movements at the mahjong 
table would barely remind them of military drill. Festa concludes his article suggesting that there 
are elements of vertigo and possession (ilinx) in mahjong, which might contain possibilities of a 
‘sympathetic agonism’ that is ‘internalized and generalized’ by ‘mahjong mimesis’. Such a 
‘sympathetic agonism’ might in the end partake ‘in the production of a public space marked by 
democratic plurality, progress, and change’ (2007:117). That mahjong could mimic a 
‘sympathetic agonism’ of democratic plurality in Taiwan seems a bold speculation to me. But be 
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that as it may, the agonies of democratic development are surely very different across the Taiwan 
Strait. 
 
As Festa argues, gambling animates certain ‘imaginaries’ intimately linked to the state. Yet these 
imaginaries are locally specific in Bashan, and they are linked to the state in different ways from 
those Festa may have observed in Taiwan. Before coming back to what might be ‘simulated’ or 
‘mimicked’ in ordinary gambling in Bashan, let us have a look at what is concretely produced in 
gambling, according to local folk theory: social heat. 
 
The Ambiguities of Social Heat 
In Bashan any notable social event should be ‘noisy and hot’ (E. naore, P. renao or honghuo). 
The liveliness, noise, and heat implied in the word naore is the ideal characteristic of a festival, a 
banquet, a market, and of gambling. Houses that are high up in the mountains and far away from 
roads are said to be ‘lonely’ and ‘cold’ in the vernacular. Contrasted to this is the ‘liveliness’ and 
‘hotness’ of the street and the market. This is related to the cultural ideal of having a household 
that is ‘lively and hot’ of which the most obvious sign would be many children crowded under 
one roof.7 Coming together for any eventful gathering – temple fairs, banquets, or gambling for 
instance – produces social heat and ‘red-hot’ exuberance according to a kind of ‘sociothermic 
theory of sociality’ as Adam Chau has called it. Using examples such as men’s drinking games 
and temple fairs, he has described this field of social heat as ‘red-hot sociality’ and a Chinese 
kind of ‘folk event production’ (Chau 2006: chapter 8; see also Chau 2008). Yet this kind of ‘red-
hot sociality’ is not unequivocally evaluated positively: temple fairs had been prohibited for long 
times as feudal superstition and, for many urbanites, the drinking games which Chau cites as 
examples of the production of ‘red-hot sociality’ (Chau 2008:493-94) are signs of coarse and 
uncivilized peasantness. The negotiation around the social heat produced in gambling and how it 
is evaluated differently by different actors is thus precisely the focus of this article.  
 
In the case of gambling, the ambivalence of social heat parallels the general distinction between 
‘social gambling’ and ‘problem gambling’. In Chinese, this opposition is matched closely by the 
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two words that are most commonly used for ‘gambling’: wan and du. The first is more 
entertainment and play, whereas the second clearly denotes the involvement of money and betting. 
As Pina-Cabral and Chan illustrate in their analysis of gambling in Macao, the decision whether a 
certain game is better described as one or the other is certainly a question of perspective – 
frequently the gamblers themselves will prefer to speak of wan (Pina-Cabral 2002:82ff). This 
wan side of gambling is also extremely important for the celebration of kinship, of friendship, 
even of relatedness in general. To ‘play’ (wan) together is the best way to cement a relationship. 
Wan can involve gambling, but also many other social activities, such as playing games of any 
kind, eating, making an excursion, chatting, joking, etc. The social exchanges in these activities 
ideally should be lively, hot, and noisy (E. naore), in short, they should produce ‘social heat’. It is 
the other side of gambling – du – that is purely associated with betting and money. High-stakes 
card games played by young men such as the one mentioned at the beginning of this article are 
almost unequivocally called “gambling” (du). There are other games, in particular the pastimes of 
elders, which will be just as unequivocally called wan. But perhaps the larger part of these 
practices lies in between those two extremes, and there is a lot of ironic playing with the 
positioning of these forms of gambling with respect to what is socially acceptable and what not.   
 
Zha jinhua, the game mentioned at the beginning, is in fact not the most common one in Bashan, 
and it is reserved generally for young men.  The games most frequently played in the villages of 
Bashan are mahjong and two card games: dou dizhu (“struggle against the landlord”) and shaofo 
(P. shaohu, “pull and win”). These games are played in the most diverse occasions, during 
weddings, funerals, and other family celebration; and very often on rainy days at home. During 
the ‘idle’ period of the peasant calendar (nongxian), and in particular at the time of the Spring 
Festival, many people will gamble all day with their families, or with relatives and neighbours. 
The period of the Spring Festival is a time of permissiveness, of amusement in the home amongst 
relatives and close friends that more often than not takes the form of gambling.8 Such forms of 
gambling will be unequivocally called ‘wan’ – which is more the ‘play’ side of gambling. 
Similarly encouraged, if to a somewhat lesser extent, is the gambling at family celebrations like 
weddings, funerals and house inaugurations.  
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Setting up a gambling table and providing guests with a set of mahjong tiles or playing cards 
belongs to the proper ways of hosting a guest, together with offering cigarettes and a meal. This 
is particularly relevant for families of higher social standing, where guests are frequent and 
hosting is a sign of distinction; gambling equipment is a necessary household asset in such 
families. Guests can include friends, business partners and officials; and to entertain guests 
spending some time together in “amusement” and “play” (wan) is the best – and often necessary 
– way to establish and maintain good relationships. Before exploring the intricacies of gambling 
further, it is necessary to make explicit the images of fate and luck that are very often associated 
with such families as they play an important role in the social idiom in which gambling is viewed 
and evaluated.  
 
Fate and Fire 
In an article on Chinese notions of happiness and self-fulfilment, Wang Mingming (1997 [1986]) 
demonstrates how people in villages in Southern Fujian judge achievement and failure with the 
oppositional pair of capability (nengli) and life/fate (ming). Ming most basically means one’s life, 
but it also connotes someone’s fate.9 Wang delineates this opposition as a local ‘social ontology’ 
(shehui bentilun), structurally similar to the opposition of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ in the social 
sciences. The metaphorical relationship between ‘capability’ (nengli) and ‘fate’ (ming) can be 
paralleled in life histories, and also in the discourses on and the practice of gambling in rural 
China. When asked about their life stories, and in particular, the reasons for success or failure in 
their lives, many people in Bashan would end either with stressing their capabilities (nengli or 
benshi), or bluntly relating it to their good ‘fate’ (ming). Every time I insisted on this point, trying 
to force a decision on either of both, people would admit that it is in fact both elements, and the 
relationship between them can never be finally determined.  
 
Beyond that, it is also difficult to claim at any point in time that someone’s life has been happy 
and successful. The criteria for happiness were traditionally sons, wealth, and long life, but sons 
can become prodigal, wealth can invite jealousy, and old people can fall ill. Moreover, these 
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traditional criteria have become highly ambiguous in recent decades, most obviously the 
aspiration for many sons. Family planning is strictly enforced in Bashan, and government 
propaganda continuously repeats that ‘girls are just as good as boys’. The pursuit of material 
wealth was strongly condemned under Maoism, and though it is now again fully legitimized, to 
become a marker of happiness and success wealth also needs to be continuously exchanged in 
proper ways. Regarding all these measurements of ‘happiness’, it is crucially important to 
demonstrate one’s success to others at appropriate times and in appropriate ways. This display of 
happiness and success invariably includes conspicuous consumption and the production of ‘social 
heat’, as for instance in banquets and family celebrations. Hence to be able to produce social heat 
is constitutive of living in a socially meaningful way, and showing one’s life-fate (ming) to others 
– and perhaps constitutive of having a life-fate (ming) at all.10   
 
In this sense, it is not coincidental that the word for ‘luck’ that is commonly used in Bashan – 
huoqi – is also related to warmth and fire. In a standard Mandarin dictionary huoqi means “anger, 
temper; heat in human body; cold-resistant capacity; internal heat”, but in the local dialect it is 
generally used in the sense of luck (P. yunqi). Another very similar word can also be used as an 
attribute signifying luck and good fate: huose. This is explained by locals as similar to saying that 
someone’s ‘flame’ (P. huoyan) is ‘high’. There are at least two senses to this word. One is 
spiritual, meaning that one’s ‘life-force’ is strong; thus, one could say that ghosts will not attack 
someone whose huose is good, because they would fear him, whereas they would attack someone 
whose huose is not good. The other sense, which is much more commonly used by young people, 
means basically that someone is capable, tough, and impressive.11 
 
This semantic field of heat, vitality and success stretches from the proper warmth of a social 
occasion (E. naore), to luck (E. huoqi and huose), and can be also extended to how a business 
should be: like fire (huo). Saying that a business goes like “fire” (huo) means that it is going 
exceptionally well. And, this relationship is certainly not only semantic: people who are 
successful in business will have many reciprocal relationships (laiwang), to be seen in the fact 
that they frequently receive guests and partake in the “heat” of celebrations, of commensality, and 
of amusement (wan), which in turn often means gambling together.  
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Commensality in hosting a guest also reveals in particular ways the verticality and horizontality 
of the relationships between the people at the table: there will be a clear positioning of the seats at 
the table according to criteria of age, rank, and power. Inferiors, sitting on the “lower seats” 
(xiawei), will invite those at the “higher seats” (shangwei) to drink. (The ‘lower seats’ are 
generally closer to the doors and the ‘higher seats’ opposite the door, where the ancestral shrines 
were placed in farm houses.) An important guest will invariably sit at such a higher seat. In these 
toasts, one can clearly see an expression of homage on the one side (the inferior invites the 
superior), and of reciprocity on the other (both drink exactly the same amount).12 Just as when 
inviting someone to eat and to drink, there is a particular emphasis on formality and equal 
participation in gambling. Gambling means placing one’s luck in the hands of that ruthless 
arbitrator, the mahjong tiles or the cards. Everyone sticks to the rules, and there is an elaborate 
ethics of proper behaviour and of paying one’s gambling debts. But just as with commensality, 
hierarchical relationships are plainly visible in gambling. During gambling, the powerful and rich 
generally end up showing that the “fire” (E. huose) of their life is higher – by demonstrating 
indifference to the loss of huge sums, or by winning. Often the inferiors will let them win to 
make the superior feel good, a form of indirect “gift” to them. If the social distance between the 
superior and the others is too great, the superior can also simply refuse an invitation to gamble, 
blocking the occasion for reciprocity and mutual indulgence in social heat all together.  
 
This element of “fire” is parallel to what is called yun in the standard Chinese expression for 
“luck” (P. yunqi). Both categories are more susceptible to human influence than is ming, which is 
“fate”, but also just simply “life”. Fire-like luck (P. yunqi, E. huoqi) stands more for the everyday 
contingency, which can be manipulated by everyday means. It can be seen within gambling, and 
immediately so, after every round. Ming (fate/life), however, has to do with the outside limits of 
gambling, and its place in the wider social environment. One’s ming will not be changed in one 
round of gambling, but it is still visible in the way one participates – or does not – in gambling 
rounds. Through participation in gambling, people show that they are ready to take risks; in 
particular they take the risk of losing money at high stakes. The higher the stakes, the higher is 
the possible prestige of the person who loses it. The propriety of such behaviour, in particular of 
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the powerful, is much talked about. And so are the boundaries of gambling, of that which goes 
beyond what is socially expected as “entertainment” and mutual amusement (wan) in social 
“heat” and becomes unsocial gambling (du).  
 
The Boundaries of Gambling  
Boundaries of Gambling I:  in Local Sociality 
The contrary evaluation of the willingness to take high risks is crucial for the boundaries of 
socially accepted gambling in local sociality. If participation in gambling shows that one’s ming 
is really powerful, this is even more so the case if the stakes are high, and the respective games 
are ‘based entirely on luck’ (wanquan shi huoqi), as people sometimes said about mahjong and 
the local card games dou dizhu and shaofo. When asked directly, most gamblers would say that in 
these games the ratio of luck and capability is about 80% to 20%.13 But while some people 
(especially young men) would interpret this high risk as a display of strength and character, 
others (especially older people) would condemn it as irrational and immoral.  
 
At least sometimes the risk taking of the young seemed to be excused as youthful folly, or even 
positively acknowledged as manly bravery.14 Several middle-aged men told me that they did not 
gamble much today but that when they were young, they were tremendous gamblers. So did one 
man in his thirties, when we were leaving the house where some neighbours had been gambling 
for about ten days in a row during the “idle months” (nongxian) of the peasant calendar. On the 
way home he burst out “mahjong, mahjong, mahjong; all the time mahjong. It is so boring and 
useless.” I asked him why then he gambled at all, if it was just boring? He answered that there is 
just nothing else to do. “Anyway, it’s just fun (hao wan), there are no big stakes in there.” When 
he was young, he went on, he gambled much more. And he would not lose tens or hundreds of 
yuan, like now, but tens of thousands of yuan in just one night. In this way, men often played 
down their gambling now as mere “entertainment” (wan), but still insisted that they had 
experience with much riskier and hazardous gambling when they were young.  
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Contrary to this acknowledgment of risk taking in high-stakes gambling, many others condemned 
the gambling attitudes of the young and described the belief that through gambling one could 
show daring strength and power as erroneous and misguided.  If gamblers failed to fulfil social 
expectations, in particular earning enough money to marry, they will face fierce criticism, both 
from their family and from outsiders. Even worse would be the case of a married man who 
gambled away all of his family’s wealth. Such examples were often referred to as people who had 
a bad ‘fate’ (ming), and so were their parents, who might have been hard-working people. 
 
A case in point in Zhongba was Hu Yanglong. His father Hu Xungao had been extremely hard 
working, to the extent that the neighbours would often call him a “model worker” (laodong 
mofang). He had never been officially awarded this honorific title, however; to the contrary, 
during the Maoist era, he had been classed as a “rich peasant” and hence had suffered a lot in 
“struggle sessions” and everyday humiliation. Against many odds, and with a lot of hard work, he 
had built a huge tea factory in the 1980s. One of the first major tea factories in Zhongba when 
there was less competition on the tea market, it yielded substantial profit for the family. Far from 
retiring, the model worker started several other enterprises, toiling day and night. He was one of 
the first to grow his own tea shoots, and he also had a minor construction business. When there 
was nothing else to do, he made chairs and tables at home, as he was also a skilled carpenter and 
joiner. At the time of Hu Yanglong’s marriage, his father was building a huge new house for his 
son on the market street of Bashan, on land belonging to Hu Yanglong’s father-in-law. This 
marriage was considered an extremely good match, the father-in-law providing wealth and 
building lots on the market place and Hu Xungao building two houses, one of which they sold 
later to build the next tea factory.  
 
Hu Yanglong was the youngest son of three; his two older brothers got the tea factory at home 
and the house, whereas he inherited the house on the market street. With that, he was clearly the 
most favoured one, a rather common pattern locally for the youngest son. His father had from 
early on demanded too much of the other sons, and the oldest son had left the area some fifteen 
years before to work in another province, while the second son had had several major fights with 
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his own father. Being the most favoured and youngest son, Hu Yanglong had never worked much 
in his life. He got involved in some small tea business but preferred spending his time gambling 
mahjong and visiting brothels.  
 
Soon after I had made his acquaintance, the village officials told me not to spend time with him: 
‘This guy is up to no good’, they said. Yet some young men would also speak in awe of his 
exploits at the gambling table, and tell stories about him and his companions. In 2007, after 
several fights with his wife related to gambling debts, he divorced her, and the family had to sell 
the house on the market. In local gossip he was then mostly described as a “spendthrift” and 
“prodigal son” (baijiazi), and not even the young men who had respected him before found many 
good words for him. It was clear that he had transgressed the boundaries of what was acceptable. 
The risks he had taken had been too high, and instead of displaying a mighty ming, he had shown 
not only that he had no ‘luck’, but also that his ming was bad.  
 
This kind of condemnation by talk and gossip in the village community is well-documented in 
the literature on rural China. 15  Citing cases like Hu Yanglong’s, older people frequently 
complained about the morals of the day. Similar to corruption and prostitution, such gambling 
was a kind of social heat which had became debauched and destructive. In comments such as this 
gambling was often linked with exploitation16 and speculation17 into a morality tale of social 
decline.  
 
Let me now introduce a form of gambling which stands at the opposite of high-stakes mahjong in 
all aspects: a local card game, played mostly by old men, and unequivocally accepted as pastime 
and entertainment (wan).  
 
The shaofo game 
Mahjong is probably the most common form of gambling in the Chinese world, and is sometimes 
ironically called a distinctive trait of Chinese civilisation. In Bashan, another form of gambling 
stands in just such an ironic relation to local belonging and tradition: a card game called shaofo 
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or changpai. In various forms, this game can be found in many areas of central and south-western 
China, but each locality has its own rules and its own sets of cards. In Bashan the game consists 
of four sets of 24 long cards with one Chinese character painted in calligraphy on each of them.  
 
The calligraphy is rather intricate, and so at first it was impossible for me to decipher it. When I 
asked for the meaning of the characters on the cards, a twenty-year-old told me that it is ‘Kong 
Yiji, you know, the Kong Yiji of Lu Xun’. That did not help me either, until an old man pointed 
out to me that this is the story of ‘Kong the second brother (Kong Lao’er). You know, in China 
we have Kong the second.’ And then he told me legends about this man Kong. It began to dawn 
on me that this must be Kongzi, i.e. Confucius.   
 
The 24 characters form eight verses of three characters each, and make up a poem:  
 
shang da ren His Greatness 
qiu yi ji Confucius 
hua san qian has taught three thousand students 
qi shi xian of which seventy became virtuous scholars. 
er xiao sheng A young student like you 
ba jiu zi should study from eight or nine sages  
jia zuo ren should learn how to be benevolent  
ke zhi li and hence understand courtesy and manners. 
 
The rules of the game are similar to mahjong; people pull cards from the stock in turn, and the 
one who first reaches a full combination of all his cards in families of three, or sets of three or 
four of the same card, wins. 
 
What is remarkable about shaofo, however, is the social confinement within which it takes place: 
it is exclusively elder men who play the game, and it is played mostly on occasions where it 
clearly does not conflict with other demands. The accusation of wasting time instead of doing 
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productive work almost never appears here; people play shaofo only on the right occasions, that 
is, on rainy days when there is not much to do anyway, when visiting relatives or on holidays.  
 
Furthermore, as if the ideals of Confucian ethics and propriety written on the playing cards 
demanded it, this game almost never takes place with very high stakes, nor is it played all night. 
It is primarily a pastime for elder men. This stands in stark contrast with high-stakes mahjong, 
played by the likes of Hu Yanglong. Whilst the latter is generally judged as “gambling” (du), 
shaofo obviously remains within the accepted boundaries of play and amusement (wan). Yet 
shaofo carries with it another kind of ambiguity, which is the ambiguity of a traditionalism which 
is an essential part of local sociality and at the same time a source of lingering embarrassment 
vis-à-vis outsiders and the modernist state discourse. 
 
Boundaries of Gambling II:  Cultural Intimacy and the State 
The cards of the shaofo game, and the poem about Confucius on them, stand in an ambivalent 
relationship to dominant and official orthodoxy. On the one hand, they stand for uprightness and 
conformity, invoking solemn verses and ideals, and the social confinement of gambling. But they 
also represent parody of the archaism of the classical language of Confucian ethics – and of 
sentences that have been repeated countless times, and mostly only half understood.  
 
The verses on the shaofo game were commonly used in late imperial China to teach reading and 
writing to boys, who had to copy the characters written with brushstrokes, and memorize the 
verse. By doing so, sons were supposed also to learn the good ways of ‘benevolence’ (ren) and 
‘propriety’ (li). The stories that old men still tell about “Kong the second” and his deeds fulfil a 
similar purpose: they generally have a clear moral which is invariably phrased in the Confucian 
idiom of filial piety (xiao), loyalty (zhong), benevolence (ren), and propriety (li).  
 
What the young man first told me when I asked after the meaning of the characters on the cards is 
nonetheless intriguing: he simply referred to the “Kong Yiji of Lu Xun”, and gave no further 
explanation. The short story “Confucius” (Kong Yiji) by Lu Xun belongs to the canon of required 
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reading that any middle school student in the People’s Republic has to study. In the short story a 
bedraggled Confucian scholar is mockingly called by the nickname “Confucius” (Kong Yiji). 
Kong Yiji speaks the arcane language (zhi hu zhe ye) of the scholar-officials, but he is 
impoverished and known as a thief and a drunkard. The narrator describes him at the inn, where 
he usually gets drunk, whilst the other guests are poking fun at him. Written in 1918, the short 
story is a parody on the anachronism and emptiness of the classical language of Confucian ethics, 
and with it of traditional China in its totality.18  
 
This short story became a core text of the radical critique of the Confucian tradition from the May 
Fourth Movement in 1919 onwards. Its radical turn against tradition was rather limited to urban 
intellectuals during the first decades of the 20th century. Yet over the course of the century, the 
extraordinarily forceful rejection of tradition would become hegemonic discourse in China. 
Slogans such as “Destroy the Shop of Confucius” (dadao kongjia dian) and put “Science and 
Democracy” (kexue yu minzhu) in its place were taken over by the Chinese Communist Party. 
During the Maoist era, similar slogans including the rejection of the Confucian tradition were 
taught in school and endlessly repeated in “class struggle sessions”, over radios, loudspeakers, 
and on wall newspapers (dazibao).  
 
Even though much has changed regarding the public evaluation of Confucianism, the memory of 
this past still renders elements of popular Confucianism into a lingering source of embarrassment. 
Let me quote now a description of shaofo that reflects a sense of embarrassment about the 
Confucian ethics of propriety, or li. The following is a blog entry on the internet written by a 
young man from the provincial capital Wuhan, probably an employee or government official, 
musing on shaofo:  
 
In the evening some old people sat down next to the road in the shadow of the trees 
and played a card game together. [He went closer, and discovered, to his surprise, that 
the poem of “His Greatness Confucius” was written on the cards.] These 24 characters 
originally had been the “textbooks” used in feudal society to teach writing and educate 
children. […] Confucius had been the patron saint for which every feudal dynasty 
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(fengjian wangchao) since the Han was beating the drums; obviously these 24 
characters refer to Confucius and the basics of his thought, and they are imbued with 
feudal ritual and rules (fengjian lifa). But the fact that the vast masses of working 
people made this poem into a card game for entertainment is really quite interesting. 
Who says that the rules and etiquette of Confucius chagrined the working people? 
Your emperor treated it as the highest doctrine, and used it as a “textbook” to 
tyrannize students, you say? As for me, I play with this form, play with it in the same 
way I would play mahjong – what do you want to do about that? 
[…]  
This is just a card game, why think so much?  
(Guangming Shibei 2007) 
 
It should be noted that this was written in 2007; the modernist condemnation of the Confucian 
doctrine still had its grip on the mind of at least this blogger. This provides quite a glaring 
contrast to the re-appropriation of Confucianism by the government and mainstream media that 
was taking place at the same time in the cities and via academic circles. In recent years, the 
Chinese government has installed Confucius Institutes all over the world, and the study of the 
Confucian classics is a declared priority. TV shows in which university professors discuss the 
works of Confucius, Mencius, and other classics of Chinese philosophy, history, and literature, 
are hugely popular. The most popular of these is “Lecture Room” (baijia jiangtan), a programme 
where intellectuals discuss the classics and relate them to issues of contemporary everyday life. 
The most successful TV Confucians are Yu Dan and Yi Zhongtian. Their books, in particular Yu 
Dan’s comments on the Confucian Analects (Yu 2006), became huge bestsellers over the last 
couple of years. Actually one of my neighbours in Zhongba, a farmer and retired village official, 
also read one of Yi Zhongtian’s books in the evenings after working in the fields. This all goes to 
show that the modernist denial of the Confucian tradition has long ceased to be hegemonic. In 
fact, for many urban Chinese the kind of Cultural-Revolution style condemnation of 
Confucianism has become an embarrassment, a show of uncivilized peasant despotism.  
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As the Confucian morals represented by the characters on the shaofo cards have become highly 
ambiguous, so have the Confucian morals represented by the rounds in which shaofo is actually 
played. It is in these rounds that the strongest judgements about the lack of morality of the young 
can be heard. But for many of the young, the rounds and card games of the old men represent 
village-level gossip and peasant narrow-mindedness, exactly those things that have to be left 
behind if one enters ‘the big world’ (da shijie) of the cities. Recalling the ambiguities of popular 
Confucianism and potentially representing peasant backwardness, these games are also 
something that is not strictly encouraged by officialdom. It is rather something that is tacitly 
permitted – but definitely not publicly displayed.19 After all, shaofo itself is also a form of 
gambling.  
 
Shaofo is also barely ever mentioned in the local media. The intricate ambiguities that come with 
it are more muted, especially when compared with high-stakes card games and mahjong. Every 
now and then, high-stakes gambling is loudly condemned in the newspapers and on TV, and 
regularly, there are reports about businessmen and officials who were punished for taking part in 
gambling.20 In a similar vein, high-stakes gambling is often portrayed in the newspapers as the 
pastime of thugs and shady elements in society. 21  In newspaper articles and political 
announcements, ‘gambling’ (dubo) is not presented as the flip side of economic development, but 
as residual of ‘backward’ (luohou) peasant culture, in the same category as lack of hygiene and 
‘feudal superstition’ (fengjian mixin).22  
 
The irony here is that it is precisely those who try hardest not to be peasants, that is, migrant 
workers, rural businessmen and officials, who are the focus of such attacks. They themselves 
always describe their actions as harmless “entertainment” (wan), and yet the “fire-like” sociality 
that is created in such entertainment is something that is frowned upon by the authorities. 
Officials in particular are the targets of regular government campaigns against gambling. 
However, as everybody knows but no one can quite say publicly, there are good social reasons for 
the fact that local officials are very often heavy gamblers. Besides individual propensities and the 
boredom of a life in the civil service, there is another reason for the frequency of gambling 
amongst officials: it serves the function of establishing tight relationships to superiors, to peers 
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and to business partners, in the celebration of lively, vital and “hot” sociality. Tight relationships 
welded by social heat, however, are often necessary to be an effective official or businessman. 
 
Officials, the businessmen who collaborate with them, and the migrant workers who aspire to 
become businessmen, all have to engage with the moving boundaries of socially acceptable 
gambling on an everyday basis. The official discourse of newspapers and TV is not yet very 
sophisticated here: gambling is either not mentioned at all, or strongly condemned. But elsewhere 
in China, gambling – mahjong at least – has already become the object of a normalizing discourse 
related to the government’s aim to create frameworks of “civilized” leisure activities. 
 
So argues Paul Festa, for instance: with the example of a governmental and academic discourse 
on mahjong, he exemplifies a normalizing framework and a ‘moral regulation’ of the emerging 
mass consumer culture in the People’s Republic of China (Festa 2006). Dealing primarily with 
consumption, these discourses also elaborate on notions of civility and national belonging. 
Festa’s examples for these ‘mahjong politics’ are exclusively textual, mainly focusing on one 
treatise entitled “The Study of Mahjong” (majiangxue) by Sheng Qi, which suggests an academic 
investigation on mahjong, and gives recommendations for ‘healthy mahjong’ (jiankang majiang) 
that would be a proper expression of Chinese culture, against degraded “popular mahjong” which 
is simplified and mostly involves betting.23 Predictably, Festa concludes that there are countless 
contestations around this discursive construction. He observes ‘that popular mahjong and the 
gambling that accompanies it are alive and well’ (2006:26), and that there is an ‘official 
ambivalence over whether or not to promote healthy mahjong’, which, however, ‘merely 
underscores the party-state’s unequivocal antipathy for popular mahjong, ensuring that playing 
mahjong in contemporary China will remain at once a personal and political act’ (Festa 2006:28).  
 
In the countryside of Enshi, there is not (yet?) such a sophisticated ‘moral regulation’ of mahjong; 
the promotion of “healthy mahjong” is unheard of here. In the official and government discourses 
in Bashan, there is simply no positive evaluation of gambling that would point towards the 
normalizing moral framework Festa describes. This might arrive soon, but so far, gambling is 
either tacitly condoned (as is shaofo, mostly), or publicly denounced as corrupt practice.  
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As a practice that is both crucially important for local sociality and a potential source of external 
embarrassment, these forms of gambling are expressions of cultural intimacy in Michael 
Herzfeld’s sense (2005). This sense of intimacy arises from the tension between a modernist 
outside representation (where gambling is continuously condemned) and the continuation of local 
practices, which partly contradict the former. Towards an outsider (an urbanite, a government 
official, or an anthropologist), people refer to something like shaofo with characteristic gestures 
of irony or embarrassment: such a game is presented as a curiosity, an oddity, and potentially a 
troublesome relict of peasant traditionalism.  
 
The card games of the old men do not represent anything nearly as dangerous and unruly as the 
games of the young. Yet in another way, the high-stakes games of the young, of officials, 
businessmen, and migrant workers, also reproduce vital and hot sociality – a sociality that is the 
more intimate because it is frequently deplored in official discourse. The conflict between this 
local form of sociality and the ideological representation of gambling as a social pathology has to 
be confronted continuously. In the everyday practice of ‘social poetics’ (Herzfeld 2005), people 
creatively bring together outside representations and inside knowledge, and negotiate the moving 
boundaries of socially acceptable heat.  
 
 
Conclusion 
I started this article with the hunch about ‘occult economies’ and ‘millenial capitalism’ which 
occurred to me when I was watching young men gambling in Bashan. Admittedly, most of the 
other forms of gambling that I have described here are clearly less spectacular. But even for the 
high-stakes gambling of young men an explanation in terms of ‘neoliberalism’ would overlook 
the everyday contention of the boundaries of social heat which I have described here.  
 
Over time I had to realize that there were many aspects to the different forms of gambling 
common in Bashan which a description in such terms would miss. If the analyst imposes an 
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absolute and objectivist interpretative framework such as ‘neoliberalism’ or ‘millenial capitalism’, 
social action at the micro and medium range (which is captured here in the concepts of ‘social 
heat’ and ‘cultural intimacy’) either gets completely lost from view or becomes a mere after-
product of the posited whole. Instead of locating gambling in contemporary rural China 
somewhere inside the ‘bigger picture’ of ‘neoliberalism’ or ‘millennial capitalism’, I have 
suggested here that through the local idiom and practice of ‘social heat’ it could be understood 
better as a changing way of socializing and of displaying social success. Additionally, it 
epitomizes the contradictions between old and young, rural and urban, and local sociality and 
official/state discourse.  
 
In this article I have described how local notions of capability, luck and fate relate to a kind of 
‘social heat’ that is characterized by a certain ambiguity: while expected and necessary 
sometimes, it can also turn into deplored anti-social indulgence. From there I traced the 
boundaries of acceptable forms of “entertainment” (wan) against that which should be 
condemned as “gambling” (du), both in local sociality and vis-à-vis the local state. But the ways 
the boundaries of socially acceptable gambling are drawn in local sociality and in official 
discourse are partly contradictory. Official discourse largely condemns gambling as backward 
‘peasant’ activity, and extends its blanket condemnation to forms of gambling which are essential 
to local sociality (for which shaofo was a prime example). Yet on the other hand, official 
discourse misdescribes the high-stakes gambling which is popular precisely among those who try 
to be hardest not to be peasants, but assertively modern (local politicians, businessmen, and 
migrant workers).  
 
Older people, when asked about the morals of the time, frequently named gambling, prostitution, 
and the lack of filial piety as the signs of the decline of public morality. As regards gambling, it 
seems to me that this does not refer to gambling per se – which has long existed in China – but to 
the fact that gambling nowadays is increasingly expanding outside the confines within which it 
was socially acceptable and even expected. The production of ‘social heat’ – the liveliness and 
warmth that is good and proper on the one hand, but can turn over into corruption and chaos on 
the other – is crucial to both the accepted norms of old, and to what belongs to market 
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relationships now. The discourses and practices of gambling epitomize the moving boundaries of 
this social heat, and with them the boundaries of the socially acceptable within local sociality, and 
the outside boundaries of local sociality itself.  
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1 Chinese Renminbi are given throughout in the unit of Yuan. The exchange rate in 2006 and 2007 was approximately 
1 yuan to £0.07 (€0.11). 
2 Throughout the text, Chinese words are written italicized in the standard pinyin form. Words in the Enshi dialect 
that differ markedly in pronunciation and meaning from standard Mandarin Chinese I have marked with an “E”. All 
other Chinese words in italics are part of the vocabulary of standard Mandarin, and only marked with a “P” (for 
putonghua, i.e. standard Mandarin Chinese) if it was necessary to distinguish them from the Enshi dialect (e.g. 
“street” is “E. gai” and “P. jie”). 
3 All names of persons and of places below the prefectural level are pseudonyms. 
4 The welfare and sports lotteries are generally limited to urban regions and more common with people who have 
middle or high income; cf. Zeng and Zhang (2007) for a profile of lottery players in the city of Guangzhou. In 
Bashan there existed one lottery station in 2007, which was generally frequented by older men from the township. I 
have never seen anyone from the surrounding villages buy a lottery ticket there. The liuhecai underground lottery 
was very common in the Yangzi plains of Hubei in 2007, but had not yet arrived in the mountains of this region.  
5 A related problem is whether the society and economy of contemporary China is ‘neoliberal’ at all. Referring to its 
oligarchic corporatist state and party, the strengthening of personalist ties, and the persistence of highly un-
egalitarian hierarchies, Kipnis (2008) and Nonini (2008) argue against using ‘neoliberalism’ to describe 
contemporary China.  
6 Many ethnographies mention the topic in passing (e.g. Kulp 1925:325-326; Hsu 1948:26,65; Watson 1975:168), but 
to my knowledge Oxfeld (1991), Festa (2007), and Bosco et al. (2009) are the only texts providing focused 
anthropological analyses of Chinese gambling. 
7 Since family planning has been enforced in the 1980s, most families have only one or two children.  
8 “Both the New Year season and the Autumn Festival are times of increased licence. Gambling is sanctioned by 
custom if not by law.” (Feuchtwang 2001:104). 
9 Harrell has described the dilemmas of fate (ming) as a Chinese folk theory (Harrell 1987). For a general overview 
over different concepts of ming throughout Chinese history, see Brokaw (1991) and the contributions to Lupke 
(2005).   
10 Adam Chao imagines that in contrast to the Cartesian cogito,  ‘a Chinese peasant philosopher’ might have said ‘I 
make social heat (honghuo), therefore I am’ (2008:485). 
11 In standard Chinese the equivalent in this sense would be lihai. The character “li” means originally sharp, fierce, 
and dangerous; it can also mean “evil ghost”, as in “ligui”.  
12 Cf. Pharoah (2005: chapter 4). 
13 Festa’s gambling partners in Taiwan gave the same ratio of skill and luck in mahjong (Festa 2007:109).  
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14 It would be interesting to explore further the importance of risk taking for the performance of masculinity (as Paul 
Festa has done in his writing on Mahjong in Taiwan, see Festa 2007). Because I lack comparative data on women’s 
gambling, and for reasons of space, I do not explore the issue of gender and gambling in this article.  
15 See for instance Kulp 1925: 325-326. 
16 A teacher from the local primary school explained this to me with a saying: “the gentleman loves money, and he 
knows morally appropriate ways to get it” (junzi ai qian, qude you dao). The good-for-nothing (xiaoren), however, 
does not have morals; he will use exploitation (boxue) and gambling (dubo) to accrue wealth. 
17 The real estate market in bigger Chinese cities has been exploding, and the prices for apartments rocketing in the 
last three years; many people in the countryside, especially those who aspire to an apartment in a city, have been 
following these development closely, and they also frequently mentioned that this boom is driven by speculation and 
profiteering (touji daoba or touji maimai). Just like “exploitation” (boxue), “speculation” (touji daoba), was an 
activity the “bad classes” would engage in and be accused of under Maoism. I was told stories of neighbours that 
were criticized in class struggle sessions for selling minor goods like chairs or vegetables on the black market; they 
were said to have gone astray onto the “capitalist road” and to want to engage in speculation and profiteering (touji 
daoba). 
18 In his other classic short story Diaries of a Madman, Lu Xun had depicted the consequences of the Confucian 
teachings even more drastically: whilst studying extensively the four books and the five classics, the narrator sees the 
words “Eat People!” (chi ren) emerge between the lines of these texts. He falls into paranoia, increasingly convinced 
that the people in his surroundings, including his doctor and his brother, are prepared to eat him. All these people are 
heartless and false, and bound to a tradition that is really cannibalistic. Shortly after its first publication, Wu Yu wrote 
an essay in which the message was further reduced to a simple equation between Confucianism and Cannibalism 
(Wu 1985[1919]). This argument was frequently cited by radical intellectuals, exemplifying the cruelty of 
Confucianism, the “doctrine of li” (lijiao). Lu Xun’s short stories are reprinted in Lu Xun (2002).  
19 In summer 2007 I visited the neighbouring township Songtaiping, which is known locally to be the origin of 
shaofo, and where until now shaofo cards are printed. During this short visit, I was given several introductions to the 
local situation, mostly about local economy and culture. Even though local officials are nowadays often “digging 
out” (wajue) anything that could count as “local culture”, the shaofo game was never mentioned, only once as an 
anecdote and with a benign smile on the face of the official who told me about it.   
20 E.g. Enshi Wanbao (Enshi Evening News) 2nd January 2007, ‘wo zhou sanqi dangyuan ganbu canyu dubo anli bei 
quanshen tongbao’ (The Case of Gambling of Three Cadres from Different Levels of Enshi Prefecture has been 
Publicized in the Whole Province); Enshi Wanbao (Enshi Evening News) 29th September 2007, ‘guanyu Li Zeyu 
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dengren canyu dubo wenti de tongbao’ (Report about the Problem of Li Zeyu and Several Others who Engaged in 
Gambling).  
21 E.g. Enshi Wanbao (Enshi Evening News) 28th March 2007, ‘dubo shule qian toudao luo fawang’ (Lost Money in 
Gambling – Thief Caught in the Nets of the Law); Enshi Wanbao (Enshi Evening News) 29th October 2007, ‘dubo 
shule qian xing qie bei zhuahuo’ (Lost money in gambling – Delinquent was Caught). 
22 A report entitled “Fascination for Rural Construction and Forgetting Adversities” (mizui wangfan xin nongcun) 
gives a stereotype of how the results of successful rural development should look like: “Now the villagers and 
neighbours live together in solidarity and harmony, the villagers are actively devoted to rural construction; gambling 
(dubo) and playing cards (dapai), disputes over trifles (che pi la jin), heterodoxy and superstition (xiejiao mixin), do 
not exist in this village, and instead development, construction and knowledge are quietly on the rise.” (Songtaiping 
Township 2006).  
23 “Ideally, then, to play healthy mahjong would involve the self-cultivation of civilizing norms and, at the same time, 
the reproduction of Chineseness as a commercial value to be capitalized by the regime of accumulation” (2006:26). 
 
